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Abstract
We analyze the economic consequences of strategic delegation of the
right to decide between public or private provision of governmental ser-
vice and/or the authority to negotiate and renegotiate with the chosen
service provider. Our model encompass both bureaucratic delegation
from a government to a privatization agency and electoral delegation
from voters to a government. We identify two powerfull eﬀects of del-
egation when contracts are incomplete: The incentive eﬀect increases
the incentive part of service providers’ remuneration and we show that
strategic delegation may substitute formal incentive contracts. The
bargaining eﬀect improves the bargaining position vis a vis a private
firm with market power and leads to a lower price for the service.
Keywords: Outsourcing, Strategic Delegation, Incentives, Incomplete
Contracting, Market Power, Representative Democracy.
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1 Introduction
Governments should provide high quality services and charge low taxes.
In the last decades outsourcing has been widely used as an instrument to
reduce costs and boost the budget of both local and central governments
(see surveys by World Bank 1995, Shleifer 1998, and Megginson and Netter
2001). Most public service provision is done in environments where it is
diﬃcult to contract upon all contingencies. In this paper we focus on how
ressource allocation can be improved by delegating the outsourcing decision
to politically motivated agencies.
While outsourcing often reduces costs, it is less obvious how it aﬀects
the quality of public services: In areas like electricity provision or garbage
collection, where quality is easy to contract upon ex ante and monitor ex
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post, outsourcing and/or privatization can imply cheaper service provision
at a higher level of quality. In areas like health care, elderly care, police
enforcement or military combat service, where it is diﬃcult to describe,
monitor and contract upon quality, the choice of service provision often
involves a trade oﬀ between cost and quality.
In the present paper, we consider the case where there is a non-trivial
trade-oﬀ between cost and quality and investigate the economic implications
of delegating the authority to take the make-or-buy decision and/or to con-
tract and negotiate with public and private service providers. We consider a
simple framework where a principal delegates the decision and contracting
rights to a politically motivated agency. Our model is broad enough to cover
both the case of a national or local government that delegates to a bureau-
cratic agency, a department minister, or a politically motivated NGO, and
the case of representative democracy where voters elect a politician to decide
on the service provision. We show that delegation is a powerful instrument
to provide public and private service providers with better incentives and
to counter private market power. Ultimately our model sheeds new light
on fundamental issues like optimal provision of public service, distortion
in ressource allocation under incomplete contracting and the advantages of
representative democracy.
We build on the incomplete contracting framework of Hart, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) where a government faces a cost-quality trade oﬀ when it
chooses between contracting with a public or a private service provider. In
both cases contracts are incomplete and the service provider’s incentives are
indirect and come through renegotiation of the contract. The incentives
are therefore in general not optimal and typically stronger (for good and
bad) in the private sector. We extend this framework by endogenizing the
outsourcing price; including market power; and, rational market determined
managerial wage formation. However, the main premise of our analysis - and
therefore the main departure from the HSV97 setting - is that we assume
that agents are heterogenous and value the quality of the public service
diﬀerently.
The principal’s dual objective is to have high quality service at a low cost.
We identify two eﬀects, which make delegation a powerful tool to achieve
these goals. The first eﬀect is the incentive eﬀect pertaining to renegotiation
of the contract with the service provider. Assume that the principal finds
that inhouse provision leads to excessive costs, since the public manager has
insuﬃcient incentives to put eﬀort into reducing cost. Then the principal
can delegate the contract renegotiation to an agency who cares less about
the adverse impact on quality. The agency will be willing to pay the public
manager more for implementing cost reductions. The public manager’s in-
centive to spend eﬀort on cost reductions is increased in this way, and so is
the payment, he receives in the renegotiation. However, when his base wage
is negotiated initially, the outcome of the renegotiation is foreseen and the
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principal will make savings on the manager’s base wage since the manager’s
total pay reflects the outside option the maket for managers oﬀers. The
incentive eﬀect of delegation, therefore, eﬀectively shifts part of the fixed
salary towards incentive based pay. Hence, delegation essentially substitutes
for an explicit incentive contract.1 Notice, that the eﬀect depends both on
the agency’s higher willingness to pay and the fact that the total pay of the
manager reflects the outside options the market oﬀers him.
The second eﬀect is the bargaining eﬀect reflecting that delegation may
counter private market power. Assume that the principal prefers outsourc-
ing because she focuses more on cost cutting than on quality. Then inhouse
provision is not a real threat in the negotiation with a private firm, and if the
firm has market power it will capture part of the surplus associated with
outsourcing: the price will be relatively high. The principal can improve
upon the bargaining situation by delegating to an agency that cares more
about quality. Such an agency is more reluctant to outsource and facing a
high price from the private firm, it will not outsource. This forces the firm
to lower the price. The bargaining eﬀect implies, therefore, that delegation
is an eﬀective tool for achieving lower prices from private service providers.2
We trace the implications of these two eﬀects in four diﬀerent cases of
delegation and compare it to our benchmark case of no delegation, where the
principal keeps all decision power. The delegation cases are: mandatory in-
1The following numeric example illustrates the incentive eﬀect: Assume a principal,
P, hires a manager, M, to provide an inhouse service at a fix wage 8. M can invest
(non-contractible) at a private cost of 3. P ’s value of the service is 14 with the investment
and 10 without. With an equal split of the renegotiation surplus, M receives only 2 after
investing. Thus, M does not invest.
Imagine P delegates the decision to negotiate with M to an agency, A, that cares
more about the investment. Assume A0s value is 20 with the investment and 10 without.
Post-renegotiation now provides M a compensation of 5 implying that M invests.
With a fixed base salary of 8, P - who pays all the costs - will not delegate since the
total cost of 13 (i.e. 8 + 5) leaves her with a surplus of 1. Without delegation there is
no investment and P ends up with a surplus of 2. However, rational parties foresee the
renegotiation process and A will under delegation oﬀer M a lower base salary of 6 equal
to the original base salary (8) plus cost of investment (3) minus expected outcome of
renegotiation (5). Hence, given rational wage setting and delegation, P ends up with a
surplus of 14−6−5 = 3 which exceeds the surplus of 2 from not delegating. The incentive
eﬀect of delegation eﬀectively induces stronger incentives through increasing the incentive
part of a public manager’s compensation.
2The following numerical example illustrates the bargaining eﬀect: A given service is
worth 15 to P and can be provided at cost 10 by a public service provider or at cost 4 by
a private. The public manager delivers service at a higher quality and let ∆q > 0 be the
diﬀerence. Assume P does not care about the quality. Then P will choose the private firm
and pay 7 for the service, if prices are determined through an equal split of bargaining
surplus. However, assume that P delegates the outsourcing decision to an agency A that
values ∆q slightly less than 6. A prefers inhouse if the private service provider demands
a price (slightly) higher than 4 and the private firm thus oﬀers the service at this price.
Hence, the bargaining eﬀect of delegation secures that P gets her prefered mode of service
provision at a lower price.
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house provision, where service has to be provided inhouse by a governmental
service provider and contracting powers are delegated to an agency; arm’s
length delegation, where both the outsourcing decision and the contracting
authority are delegated; partial delegation, where the principal chooses the
type of service provider but delegates the contract and negotiation powers;
and, finally, double delegation, where each decision is delegated to diﬀer-
ent independent agencies. The diﬀerent modes have diﬀerent virtues but
they also represent diﬀerent institutions. For instance, inhouse provision is
mandatory for police services in most countries. Local or regional elections
of mayors where outsourcing is a salient issue correspond to arm’s length del-
egation and so does the case where decisions are delegated to a department
minister with full powers or an NGO.
We first focus on the important basic case where cost reductions consti-
tute the overwhelming motive and the important trade oﬀ related to out-
sourcing is that costs are lowered but so is quality. This highlights the power
of the incentive and bargaining eﬀects in an illustrative way, since there is
no incentive eﬀect under private service provision in this case. The bargain-
ing eﬀect makes arm’s length delegation better than partial delegation for
the principal, when she prefers outsourcing. When the principal cares more
about quality and prefers inhouse provision, arm’s length delegation is still
better than no delegation, but may involve the problem that the preferred
type of agency for dealing with the public manager prefers outsourcing.
Partial delegation is therefore better in some cases. When the preferred
agency prefers inhouse provision itself, partial and arm’s length delegation
are equally good for the principal as they both induce the incentive eﬀect.
In the political interpretation of arm’s length delegation where the princi-
pal is the median voter of the electorate and the agency the elected politician,
these results imply that representative democracy is better for the median
voter than direct democracy. However, we wil show conditions for when
limiting the politicians’ powers (i.e. partial delegation) generates even more
welfare.
The principal does not completely internalize the eﬀort cost of the ser-
vice provider and if she were to choose the mode of provision it would not
necessarily be the socially best. From an eﬃciency perspective, we show
that delegation dominates non-delegation and partial delegation is weakly
better than any other mode of provision except double delegation.3
When quality is the overwhelmingly important objective, the stronger
incentives in the private sector make outsourcing optimal for any type of
3Double delegation can mimick arm’s length delegation (by delegating both decisions
to the same type) and partial delegation (by delegating the outsourcing decision to a
type identical to the principal). Thus, double delegation is always weakly better for the
principal than the other two delegation modes. We are not aware of any practical examples
of double delegation; hence, we include this case as a theoretical exercise that can be used
as an upper benchmark for the other types of delegation.
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principal. In this case the incentive eﬀect is present under both public and
private service provision. The general case is a mixture of the two simple
cases and the general results will depend on which objective is dominant.
We consider the case where cost-reductions are not a minor concern and
the outsourcing decision still involves the cost-quality trade oﬀ even though
both kinds of eﬀort are important. The basic results of delegation from the
cost-reduction case bear over to this more general case.
More generally, our results shed light upon the scope of delegation as a
remedy to mitigate incentive problems due to incomplete contracting. The
analysis is based on two essential premises: First, delegation requires the
existence of heterogenous preferences. This is a natural assumption in the
area of public service provision, where groups of individuals receive diﬀer-
ent net benefits from a given public service and may have diﬀerent political
preferences. However, this is not necessarily the case in other areas where
incomplete contracting has proven to be important.4 Second, optimal del-
egation may require a talented agent with so extreme preferences that it
can be hard to find. Hence, whereas our analysis indicates that strategic
delegation is powerful in public service provision, we do not claim that it
can solve all allocation ineﬃciencies created by contractual incompleteness.
The main distinction between privatization and outsourcing is that the
former involves transfer of asset ownership from the government to the pri-
vate sector, whereas the latter focuses on the transfer - through contracts
- of rights to deliver a service for a limited amount of time. The theo-
retical literature has focused on welfare consequences of privatization and
outsourcing focusing on asymmetric information (Laﬀont and Tirole (1991),
Schmidt (1996) and Shapiro and Willig (1993)) political failures (Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) and Bennedsen (1999)) and incomplete contracting (Hart,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Besley and Ghatak (2001) studies optimal own-
ership structures among two parties that both care about and invest in
public projects. They show that ownership shall be allocated to the part
that cares most about the project and apply this insight to the studies of
NGO ownership of public goods.5
All these studies focus on the normative consequences of public and pri-
vate ownership; however, they do not provide strong positive explanations of
why a self interested government would accept to outsource public service or
privatize government assets. We endogenize a self interested government’s
4For instance, we conjecture that delegation is less eﬃcient in improving resource al-
location in financial contracting, since there is less heterogeneity in individuals’ valuation
of monetary outcomes.
5 In Besley and Ghatak’s analysis a government under inhouse provision always chooses
the right investment level seen from the government’s perspektive but ignore the external
eﬀect on the NGO’s utility. In our model - as in HSV97 - there is no payoﬀ externality;
however, the government cannot - without delegation - implement the optimal investment
levels due to that public managers have too weak incentives.
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decision to outsource public service. In this aspect, our study complements a
number of recent theoretical contributions: Debande and Friebel (2004) an-
alyze why governments engage in mass privatization; Börner (2006) studies
why governments implement political reforms; and, Ellman (2006) focusses
on when a government’s loss of control reduces its responsiveness to pub-
lic opinion which can reduce the public’s political involvement. We depart
from all these studies by analyzing how strategic delegation improves the
government’s position in pre and post contractual bargaining situations.6
Empirical studies of privatization has to a large extent focused on how
increased competition has aﬀected the cost of maintaining facilities and pro-
viding public and private services (see e.g. Vickers and Yarrow (1988), World
Bank (1995) and (1997), and the survey by Megginson and Netter (1999)).
A growing number of studies address explicitly the determinants of local gov-
ernment’s make-or-buy decision. Lopez de Silanaes et.al. (1997) documents
the existence of important political motives that aﬀect the make-or-buy de-
cision at the county level in US. Brown and Potoski (2003) and Levin and
Tadelis (2005) show the importance of transaction costs in contracting when
local governments decide on outsourcing or inhouse provision of public ser-
vices. The latter study explicitly develops a measure contracting diﬃculty
and shows that it is strongly correlated with keeping service provision in-
house in US municipalities.
Our model focuses on the trade oﬀ between cost and quality of ser-
vice provision. We believe that this trade oﬀ is essential in many kind of
governmental services. The quality shading hypothesis argues that quality
may deteriorate when service production is transferred to the private sec-
tor (Jensen and Stonecash, 2005). There are no systematic evidence for a
general quality shading ; however, there are some indications that it is a con-
cern in areas where it is diﬃcult to make rigorous and enforceable contracts
upon service quality. Hartley (2004) and Fredland (2004) analyzes provi-
sion of combat and support functions to sovereign governments by private
companies. The studies conclude that there are substantial potential cost
saving from outsourcing military activities but their economic role will be
limited due to contractual hazards. There are a number of studies that link
ownership structures of hospitals to the quality of the delivered health care
(a.o. Sloan et al. 1998, Devereaux et.al. 2002 and Deber 2002) where the
ultimate measure of quality is likelihood of death. Similarly, Crampton and
Starfield (2004) discusses the quality eﬀects of private provision of primary
health service.7
6Our paper is also related to the large literature on central bank independency following
Rogoﬀ (1985). The focus in central bank delegation is on the ability to commit to a certain
future policy.
7Some studies have investigated the quality eﬀects of outsourcing garbage collection
(a.o. McDavid (2002)) an area where outsourcing generally reduces cost and frequently
increase quality.
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The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we focus on non
contractible investment in cost saving having an adverse impact on qual-
ity. We set up the basic model and analyze as a benchmark incentives to
outsource given delegation is not possible. Then we compare resource alloca-
tion and incentives to outsource under four types of delegation: mandatory
inhouse provision, arm’s length, partial and double delegation. Section 3
focuses on non contractible investment in quality improvement. Section 4
combines the two previous sections and analyzes the power of delegation
under the existence non contractible investment in both cost reduction and
quality improvement. Section 5 concludes.
2 One task: Cost reduction
We will first consider the case, where the crucial task faced in service pro-
duction is a reduction of cost. We assume that cost reductions involve a
classic trade oﬀ: When the total cost of producing the service is reduced
so is the quality of the final service. We begin this section with setting up
the basic framework of inhouse provision and outsourcing of a public service
when investment or eﬀort spent in cost reduction is non contractible. This
part consists of a simplified version of the model developed in Hart, Shleifer
and Vishny (1997). We extend their model by endogenizing managerial
wage formation and by analysing a principal’s incentives to outsource under
diﬀerent market structures when delegation is not possible. We use this as
a building block for our analysis of how optimal delegation aﬀects ressource
allocation. Finally, we investigate the welfare consequences of delegation.
The principal (e.g. a local government) provides a service, which can
be produced inhouse or outsourced. In both cases, the service provider -
the public manager or the firm - performs cost reducing eﬀort, ec, at a
private cost of 12e
2
c . The eﬀort results in plans, which may or may not be
implemented. Eﬀort is observable by both parties but non-contractible8.
The total costs of producing the service consists of renumeration of the
manager plus other costs. If the cost reduction plans are implemented, the
non-managerial cost of producing the service is lowered from C0 > 0 to
C (ec) = C0 − ec. (1)
If the principal produces inhouse, she bears the total costs consisting of
C (ec) plus renumeration of the manager. In case of outsourcing, the firm
bears the cost. We assume that the firm is owned by its manager so there
is no managerial wage cost for the firm.
8To be specific, we assume that the service provider’s investment in cost reduction
is observable but not verifiable to third parties, i.e. it cannot be written into contracts
that are enforceable ex post. This is a standard assumption in the incomplete contracting
literature (Hart 1995). For a discussion of this assumption we refer to (Maskin and Tirole
(1999) and Hart and Moore (1999).
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If the plans are implemented, the quality of the service will be reduced
to
Q (ec) = Q0 − θec. (2)
The deterioation of quality is the side eﬀect of implementing the cost reduc-
tion plans. Depending of the type of service and technical issues, this eﬀect
may be more or less severe, which is determined by the parameter θ ≥ 0.
The principal is interested in high quality but dislikes paying for the service.
When quality is Q and expenditures on the service are Y, the principal’s
utility is
V (Q,Y ) = φpQ− Y (3)
where φp ≥ 0 is the weight the principal puts on quality.
The gross gain from investing in cost reduction is
s(ec, φp, θ) =
¡
1− θφp
¢
ec. (4)
As is clear from this expression, cost reducing eﬀort only gives a positive
gross surplus if φp <
1
θ .
2.1 No delegation
We first consider the base line case, where neither authority to decide on out-
sourcing and perform the initial contracting nor the authority to renegotiate
can be delegated by the principal.
2.1.1 Inhouse provision
Under inhouse provision the principal hires a manager at the competitive
market for managers and pays him a wage w. When hired, the manager
spends eﬀort, ec, resulting in plans. With total income I, and eﬀort level,
ec, his utility is
um = I − 1
2
e2c . (5)
Since eﬀort is non-contractible, the manager has no direct incentive to per-
form it. However, after eﬀort is performed (and the associated utility cost is
sunk for the manager), the parties can renegotiate his contract and decide
whether to implement the plans or not. At that point in time, the plans are
tangible and it is possible to write a contract specifying that they should
be implemented. If negotiations break down, the principal can replace the
manager, but only half of the gross gains can be realized, since the new
manager does not have the detailed knowledge and human capital of the old
manager.9
9That exactly half of the gross gains can be recouped is inessential for the qualitative
results, but it simplifies formulas nicely.
8
As the principal can recoup half of the gross surplus if the manager is
fired, the gains from renegotiation consist of the other half: 12s(ec, φp, θ),
which is split evenly so the manager’s income is w + 14s(ec, φp, θ). When
choosing eﬀort, the manager foresees the renegotiation, so his optimizing
choice is
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
1− θφp
4
(6)
if φp < 1/θ and zero otherwise.
The wage w makes the manager indiﬀerent between taking the job and
going for his outside option, which we normalize to 0. We deviate from the
wage setting in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny by assuming that the parties have
rational expectations and foresee the upcoming renegotiation.10 Therefore
the manager’s wage fulfills
w = 0− 1
4
s
¡
einc
¡
φp
¢
, φp, θ
¢
+
1
2
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢2 .
When φp < 1/θ, so eﬀort is positive, the total expenditure for the principal
is
Y in
¡
φp
¢
= C0 − einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
+ w +
1
4
s
¡
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
, φp, θ
¢
(7)
= C0 −
1− θφp
4
+
1
2
µ
1− θφp
4
¶2
and the principal’s utility from in-house provision is
uin = φp
µ
Q0 − θ
1− θφp
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− θφp
4
+
1
2
µ
1− θφp
4
¶2!
. (8)
When φp ≥ 1/θ, i.e. eﬀort is zero, the total expenditure is just C0 and the
principal’s utility is φpQ0 − C0.
For later comparison we find the first best level of eﬀort, i.e. the eﬀort
level that maximises the net surplus between the manager and the principal,
N(ec, φp, θ) = s(ec, φp, θ)−
1
2
e2c =
¡
1− φpθ
¢
ec −
1
2
e2c (9)
For φp < 1/θ it is
e∗c
¡
φp, θ
¢
= 1− θφp (10)
10Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997 assume that the public manager receives a fixed wage
weakly larger than his outside option. Hence, the government does not foresee the rene-
gotiation implying that the manager ends up with a total compensation strictly larger
than his outside option. We believe that a rational government recognizes that it can
lower the fixed part of the manager’s remuneration below the relevant reservation wage,
because both manager and government know that additional payment will follow in the
renegotiation process.
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny briefly discuss the possibility that the manager oﬀers the
government some of his post contractual rent but catagorize such actions as corruption.
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otherwise it is zero.
To sum up, the contractual incompleteness lead to ineﬃciency since the
public manager’s eﬀort level is too low compared to first best. The reason is
that the renegotiation provides the manager with too weak incentives, since
he only internalizes a quarter of the total value created by his action.
2.1.2 Outsourcing
When the service provision is outsourced, the principal and a private firm
conclude a contract stipulating that the firm produces the service for the
price p0 and bears the associated costs. The contract can be renegotiated,
but it cannot be terminated prematurely. Then the private firm exerts non-
contracteble eﬀort, ec which results in plans for cost reduction. At this
point, the parties may renegotiate the contract. If negotiations break down,
the firm owns the plans and decides whether cost reductions will be imple-
mented. This is the crucial diﬀerence to inhouse provision. Since the firm
bears costs and is paid p0 regardless of whether the plans are implemented
or not, it will wish to implement the cost reductions.
One may wonder whether the principal would be interested in paying the
firm for not implementing the cost reduction. If φpθ < 1, then although the
principal is hurt, she is not willing to pay the firm the potential cost savings
for not implementing the cost reduction. In this case, the renegotiation
will have no eﬀect and the firm will just implement the cost reduction. For
θφp ≤ 1, therefore, the total expenditure for the principal under outsourcing
is Y o = p0. The firm’s optimal choice is
eoc = 1. (11)
If, on the other hand, 1 < φpθ, then the quality reduction hurts the principal
so much that she is willing to pay more than the potential cost reduction in
order to avoid it. Assuming - as above - that the parties split the bargaining
surplus 50:50, then such a payment would imply that the firm in fact gets
even larger benefit from eﬀort directed at cost reductions, since now the
marginal payoﬀ is 1 +
φpθ−1
2 . The optimal choice of cost reducing eﬀort
would be ec = 1+
φpθ−1
2 , and this would make outsourcing unattractive for
the principal. Below we show that outsourcing is only chosen when θφp ≤ 37
and we will therefore not pursue the case where θφp > 1 further.
The utilities to the firm and the principal from outsourcing are
uf = p0 − C0 +
1
2
and uo = φpQ0 − θφp − p0. (12)
Comparing (6), (10) and (11), we have that
einc
¡
φp, θ
¢
≤ e∗c
¡
φp, θ
¢
< eoc . (13)
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Cost reducing eﬀort is larger under outsourcing than under inhouse provi-
sion. While the public manager has no direct interest in cost reductions
and takes into account that they hurt the principal, the firm has a strong
motive to reduce cost, since it pays the cost. Outsourcing therefore involves
a tradeoﬀ, the cost of producing the service falls but it is at the expense of
quality.
2.1.3 Incentives to outsource
We envision outsourcing through a bidding process, where the lowest bidder
wins the contract. The winning price depends on the competitive environ-
ment. If the principal is a large actor in the market and the market is
competitive, it is reasonable to assume that the price will equal the com-
petitive price, where the firm earns no excess profit and the principal reaps
the whole surplus from outsourcing.11 However if competition is weak and
the firms are able to collude the outcome will not be competitive. If, for
instance, there are many local principals facing one large monopolistic firm,
the firm has significant bargaining power. If the principal invites tenders,
the private firm will only need to submit a bid, which exactly makes the
principal indiﬀerent between outsourcing and producing in-house. In this
case the private monopoly will reap the surplus from outsourcing.
The joint surplus of the principal and the firm from outsourcing is
Ω
¡
φp, θ
¢
= uo + uf −
¡
uin + 0
¢
where the zero is the value of the firm’s outside option. Inserting gives
Ω
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
½
1
32
¡
3− 7θφp
¢ ¡
3 + θφp
¢
if φp ≤ 1θ
1
2
¡
1− 2θφp
¢
if φp >
1
θ
(14)
We will assume that the parties split the surplus, so that the firm’s share
is γ (and the principal’s share is (1− γ)). Thus γ parameterizes the degree
of market power: If γ = 1, the firm reaps all surplus - the monopoly case -
if γ = 0 the principal reaps all surplus - the perfectly competitive case.
The principal’s utility from outsourcing is therefore
uo = (1− γ)Ω+ uin (15)
from which it is clear that the principal only outsources when the joint
surplus is positive. This leads to
11This will in principle also be the consequence if the principal holds some standard
auction, for instance an English auction, and there are at least two bidders who do not
coordinate their bids.
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Proposition 1 Under no delegation, a principal of type φp outsources if
and only if
φp ≤ G (θ) ≡
3
7θ
. (16)
The Proposition provides a number of interesting, empirically relevant
insights into governments’ outsourcing behaviour:
First, outsourcing is a two-edged sword. The private firm will spend more
eﬀort making cost reductions possible but this is at the cost of lower quality.
This trade oﬀ leads principals who care less for quality, to outsource, while
principals who care more for quality, tend to choose inhouse production.
The higher is θ, the more severe is the trade-oﬀ and the smaller is the cut-
oﬀ value of φp. Hence, outsourcing takes place, ceterius paribus, when the
principal does not value the benefits of the service so much and when cost
reductions do not hurt quality so much.
Second, Proposition 1 yields that the outsourcing decision is indepen-
dent of the competitiveness of the market - γ does not enter in condition
(16). While perhaps surprising at first sight, the reason is straightforward:
Outsourcing takes place when the surplus from outsourcing is positive, this
is independent of how the surplus is split. Market power does not aﬀect the
existence of the surplus, it only aﬀects how it is split.
The outsourcing price, p0, is determined such that the firm receives the
fraction γ of the outsourcing surplus, Ω. The surplus, and therefore also
the price, depends on the principal’s preference for quality. Using (8), (14)
and (15), we find the principal’s utility from outsourcing:
uo
¡
φp, θ
¢
= φpQ0 − θφp − C0 +
1
2
− γ
32
¡
3− 7θφp
¢ ¡
θφp + 3
¢
. (17)
Using (12) we find that the price equals
p0 = Y
o ¡φp, θ¢ = C0 − 12 + γ32 ¡3− 7θφp¢ ¡θφp + 3¢ , (18)
which decreases in φp for φp ≤ 37θ . A principal, who values quality more, is
more hurt by the quality reductions following the private firm’s cost reduc-
tions. This lowers the price the firm receives. The principal’s preferences
for quality has a price eﬀect.
Notice, that when the principal is of type φp = G (θ) =
3
7θ , the out-
sourcing surplus, Ω
¡
φp, θ
¢
is zero. Such a principal finds that the large cost
reductions implemented by the firm hurts quality so much, that she is of the
brink of preferring inhouse production. Facing a principal of type G (θ) , the
firm is therefore only able to get a contract if its payoﬀ γΩ
¡
φp, θ
¢
is zero -
indendently of the market structure, γ. This is true even when the private
firm is a monopolist.
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2.2 Delegation
The benchmark analysis above showed that when incentives and bargaining
outcomes are determined through renegotiation, the public manager’s eﬀort
choice and the outsourcing price do depend on the principal’s preferences.
Hence, if a principal could “misrepresent” her preferences, she may be able
to obtain less distortion in ressource allocation and/or a better price of
the service. One eﬀective way to acheive such strategic misrepresentation
is to delegate the authority to outsource and the responsibility of contract
negotiation to an independent agency.
There are multiple decisions involved in contracting and negotiating with
private and public service providers; thus, in theory there are multiple deci-
sions that can be delegated independently of each other and to independent
agencies. To structure the following analysis we divide all decisions into
two categories: First, the outsourcing-decision covers the decision to choose
between a private or a public service provider, and, second, the contract
and negotiation decision covers responsibility to hire, contract and negoti-
ate with the service provider after the form of provision has been decided.
Each of these decisions can be decided by the principal or delegated to an
agency.
We categorize the four possible cases as follows: Under Mandatory in-
house provision outsourcing is not an option and the principal delegates the
contract and negotiation decision to an independent agency. Under Arms’
length delegation the principal delegates both the outsourcing and the con-
tract and negotiation decisions to one independent agency. Under Partial
delegation the principal delegates the contract and negotiation decision to
an independent agency but does not delegate the outsourcing decision. Fi-
nally, double delegation, is the most advanced form of delegation where the
two decisions are delegated to two independent agencies.
In the following, we investigate how each of these delegation modes af-
fects incentives to outsource and the cost and quality levels of the delivered
service. The principal can choose among agencies, who also are politically
motivated and care about the quality and the cost of the delivered service.
As before principal φp values quality with the parameter φp. The agency is
chosen from a group of potential agencies, whose preferences for the quality,
characterized by φa, diﬀer. We will assume that the population is suﬃciently
heterogeneous that for any positive φa it is possible to find an agency with
φa. We exclude the possibility of negative φa, so we exclude the existence
of malevolent agencies who benefit from public service beeing of low qual-
ity. It would in fact make the analysis simpler, if we did not impose this -
reasonable - restriction.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the framework is general enough to
have several interpretations. In bureaucratic delegation the principal is the
government and the agency is an independent service provision agency that
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negotiate with private and public service providers and choose for each type
of service between inhouse provision or outsourcing. Alternatively, one could
conceive the agency as a department minister with independent powers or
a politically motivated NGO.
The second interpretation is one of representative democracy. In this
setting it is assumed that outsourcing is a decisive issue in elections. This
is most likely to be the case in elections to local governments or municipal-
ities where outsourcing of the core services of the welfare state like elderly
or health services are topical issues. The group of voters in the election
are principals and the median voter (characterized by φp) is the decisive
principal. We assume that a politician cannot commit to a policy before
the election so political promises prior to an election are cheap talk. The
elected politician is going to maximize her utility and voters realize this.
The election therefore becomes a game of delegation for the median voter.12
The median voter then elects a government with preferences characterized
by φa.
2.2.1 Delegation under mandatory inhouse provision
First we consider the case where outsourcing is not an option, but the prin-
cipal may delegate the responsibility for the service provision to an agency.
The agency has authority to hire the public manager and renegotiate the
contract. The service could be e.g. primary school provision, hospital ser-
vice or elderly care in a country where the law prescribes that municipalities
must provide inhouse provision of such service. Principal φ0ps utility when
agency φa chooses inhouse provision is
vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
= φp (Q0 − θemc (φa, θ))− Y in (φa, θ) ,
which gives
vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
= φp
µ
Q0 − θ
1− θφa
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− θφa
4
+
1
2
µ
1− θφa
4
¶2!
,
(19)
for φa < 1/θ and φpQ0 − C0 otherwise. The principal’s preferred agency
maximizes vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
among all agencies φa ≥ 0.13 This gives
Proposition 2 Under mandatory inhouse provision, the principal’s pre-
ferred agency, φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
, is given by
φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if 0 ≤ φp ≤ 34
1
θ ,
4φp − 3θ if
3
4
1
θ ≤ φp ≤
1
θ ,
any φa >
1
θ if
1
θ < φp.
(20)
12As is seen below, the median voter is well-defined.
13Here and in the sequel, it is straightforward to check that the second order condition
for maximum is fulfilled.
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The Proposition reflects that the principal takes advantage of the incen-
tive eﬀect of delegation. When the principal chooses agency, she bears in
mind that too little eﬀort is spent by the public manager on cost reductions,
since the manager only internalizes a quarter of the gross surplus, cf. (6)
and (10). The principal counters this problem by choosing an agency who
cares less than the principal about quality, as it is easily checked that
φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
< φp for φp ≤
1
θ
.
When the public manager renegotiates with the agency, the surplus from cost
reductions is higher than if renegotiations were with the principal, since the
agency values quality less and is more favorable to cost reductions. The
manager, who receives part of the surplus, therefore gets a higher marginal
pay from putting more eﬀort into cost reductions and respond by making
more eﬀort. While the principal likes the higher eﬀort, she dislikes the
increased pay to the manager. However, this is partly oﬀset in the initial
contracting. Recall that the public manager is hired at the competitive
market for managers, so his total pay will cover his eﬀort cost plus his outside
option. When signing the initial contract with the agency, he rationally
foresees the income from the renegotiation and is willing to accept a lower
base wage. Hence, the principal in eﬀect only ends up covering the manager’s
extra eﬀort cost. The incentive eﬀect implies that a larger fraction of the
manager’s pay is related to incentives. Delegation, therefore, substitutes for
a formal incentive contract.14
The incentive eﬀect improves improves eﬃciency. In fact, we have that
emc
µ
4φp −
3
θ
, θ
¶
=
1− θ
¡
4φp − 3θ
¢
4
= 1− θφp = e∗c
¡
φp, θ
¢
,
for 3/(4θ) ≤ φp ≤ 1/θ, so in these cases delegation can oﬀset all distortions
following from contractual incompleteness under mandatory inhouse provi-
sion. Principals with lower φp find that the boundary condition, 0 ≤ φa
binds. Optimal delegation would require that the principal delegates to so
extreme types, that they cannot be found in the population. Hence, al-
though delegation improves the situation for the principal in this case, it
does not solve all allocation problems. Principals with φp > 1/θ, prefer
no cost reduction at all, and this can be achieved by choosing any type of
agency fulfilling φa > 1/θ.
14Notice, it is crucial for delegation to work that the renegotiation outcome is foreseen
at the time of the initial contracting with the service provider. As noticed above this is
the main diﬀerence between our approach and the HSV97 analysis. In their framework,
delegation would not improve ressource allocation because the service providers renumer-
ation does not include the expected pay from renegotiation. Whereas delegation could
improve incentives in their analysis it would be too costly for the principal and she will
choose not to delegate as illustrated in the example in footnote (1).
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Delegation is a powerfull instrument; however, as discussed in the intro-
duction the analysis also highlights why delegation does not solve all prob-
lems related to postcontractual renegotiations. First, as we saw it might
be the case that suﬃciently extreme agents capable of negotiating with the
service provider do not exist. Secondly, the premise for delegation is that
agents are heterogeneous and have diﬀerent preferences on the trade oﬀ be-
tween cost and quality. This is a natural assumption in the context a local
bus route, an elderly home or other kind of public service. However, incom-
plete contracting has also proved to be an important modelling tool in areas
where such variation is not present (see Hart 1995), which limits the ability
of delegation to circumvent ressource allocation ineﬃciencies.
2.2.2 Arm’s Length Delegation
As discussed in the Introduction, delegation can be an institutional choice as
in the case of representative democracy, where voters delegate to an elected
politician. However, it can also be the only feasible arrangement, since
political leaderships necessarily have to delegate many tasks to subordinates,
including the authority to decide on some service provision tasks. To cover
these settings, we begin with the case where the principal delegates to an
agency, who both decides on the mode of service provision and is responsible
for hiring and negotiating with the service provider.
Under arm’s length delegation, the principal is aware that agencies with
0 ≤ φa ≤ G (θ) will outsource, while those with G (θ) ≤ φa will choose
inhouse provision.15
Principal φ0ps utility when agency φa outsources is
vout
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
= φp (Q0 − θ)−
µ
C0 −
1
2
+
γ
32
(3− 7θφa) (θφa + 3)
¶
(21)
and the most preferred agency maximizes this among those who outsource.
The most preferred among those who prefer inhouse provision maximizes
vin
¡
φa|φp, θ
¢
(as given in (19)). Straightforward maxization and comparison
of the indirect utilities under inhouse provision and outsourcing respectively
gives:
Proposition 3 Under arm’s length delegation, the outsourcing decision is
the same as under no delegation. Principal φ0ps preferred agency, φ
al
a
¡
φp, θ
¢
,
15An agency with φa = G (θ) is indiﬀerent between inhouse provision and outsourcing.
We assume that in this case the agency chooses the principal’s most preferred option.
Otherwise, the principal could delegate to a type G (θ) − ε if she preferred outsourcing
and type G (θ) + ε if she preferred inhouse provision, where ε is vanishingly small.
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and the outsourcing decision is given by:
φala
¡
φp, θ
¢
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
G (θ) if 0 ≤ φp ≤ G (θ) outsourcing,
G (θ) if G (θ) ≤ φp ≤ 2G (θ) inhouse,
4φp − 3θ if 2G (θ) ≤ φp ≤ 1/θ inhouse,
any φa >
1
θ if
1
θ < φp inhouse.
Principals with low preference for quality, who prefer outsourcing, take
advantage of the bargaining eﬀect and delegate to an agency of type φa =
G (θ). This agency cares more about quality than the principal and is at the
brink of preferring inhouse provision. When contracting with the private
firm this agency is a tough negotiator, since it finds the firm’s expected
cost savings problematic for quality. The outsourcing surplus between this
agency and the firm is negligble (zero actually) and the outsourcing price is
therefore as low as possible.
The incentive eﬀect plays no role here, since the firm will just imple-
ment the cost savings without further renegotiation. Principals, who prefer
inhouse provision, take advantage of the incentive eﬀect, just as they did
under mandatory inhouse provision, and delegate to agents, who care less
about quality than the principal. However, principals with intermediate
valuations of quality, where G (θ) ≤ φp ≤ 2G (θ) run into the problem that
the preferred agency under mandatory inhouse provision now wishes to out-
source. Hence, the principal has to modify the choice of agency to a type
who just chooses inhouse provision. This still gives an incentive eﬀect, but
not so much as the principal would have wished for. Principals with even
higher preference for quality do not encounter this problem, they can freely
choose the most preferred agency under inhouse provision and stay confident
that this agency also prefers inhouse provision.
Arm’s lenght delegation does not change the outsourcing decision: Prin-
cipals delegate to an agency, who makes the same decision on outsourcing
as the principal would herself. The reason is that the bargaining eﬀect and
the incentive eﬀect partly oﬀset each other: The bargaining eﬀect induces
the principal to choose an agency who values quality more than herself, the
incentive eﬀect induces her to choose an agency who values quality less.
Consider a principal of type G (θ) + ε, where ε is very small. Even though
she could get (almost) as good a bargain with the private firm as agency
G (θ) , she prefers inhouse provision under no delegation. When she dele-
gates, she will, therefore, not be interested in delegating to agency G (θ)
who outsources. Similarly, principal G (θ)− ε prefers outsourcing under no
delegation even though she herself would induce (almost) the same incen-
tives for the public manager as the lowest type agency, who chooses inhouse
production, type G (θ). Type G (θ) − ε will therefore not be interested in
delegating to an agency, who chooses inhouse provision. The result is that
the outsourcing decision is not changed by arm’s length delegation.
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Since the bargaining eﬀect and the incentive eﬀect go in opposite direc-
tions, principals prefer agencies, who are closer to being indiﬀerent between
outsourcing and inhouse provision than the principal herself is. In the con-
text of representative democracy, where the provision of public goods is
the salient issue, this implies that voters vote for politicians who are more
moderate than themselves.
The principal’s optimal agency has preferences diﬀerent from the prin-
cipal for almost all principals (if φp < 1/θ). In the context of democracy
Proposition 3 has the important implication that representative democracy
is better for the median principal than direct democracy. We also note that
a principal’s preferred agency is weakly increasing in φp. If one imagines
that diﬀerent voters in the electorate has diﬀerent φp, this implies that the
preferred agency of the voter with the median value of φp is a Condorcet
winner.
2.2.3 Partial delegation
Arm’s length delegation provides the principal with the strategic benefits of
delegation. However, as we saw the principal may encounter the problem
that the preferred agency under - say - inhouse provision prefers to outsource.
This limits the principal’s options and the principal has to choose a second
best agency of type φa = G (θ). The principal can avoid this problem by
taking the outsourcing decision herself. We have already considered the case
of mandatory inhouse provision above, now we focus on the case where the
principal first decides on the mode of provision, contracts with the service
provider and then delegates the authority to renegotiate with the service
provider to an agency. We call this partial delegation.
When the private market is characterized by some market power it is
not an option for the principal to specify that the agency shall outsource
and leave the price negotiations to the agency - at least this is a very bad
option. If the agency is forced to outsource, the outsourcing surplus is
infinite and the price undetermined as the model is specified. This reflects
that in reality the agency would fall prey to the monopoly power of the
firm(s). We therefore consider the case where the principal herself conducts
negotiations with the firm if outsourcing is chosen. Both parties understand
that the alternative for the principal is to choose inhouse provision. When
the mode of provision is chosen - and if outsourcing occurs, the firm’s price
is set - the principal chooses the best agency to conduct the renegotiation.
The best agency then depends on the chosen mode of provision.16 In the
price negotiations with the private firm both parties realize this.
From Proposition 2 we know that if the principal chooses inhouse pro-
vision and φp ≤ 34
1
θ , then φa = 0 and ec = 1. The utility to the principal in
16 In fact, any agency is optimal when outsourcing is chosen, since there will be no
renegotiation in this case, as discussed above.
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this case is
vin
¡
0|φp, θ
¢
= φp
µ
Q0 −
1
4
θ
¶
− C0 +
7
32
.
If, on the other hand, outsourcing is chosen, then ec = 1, and the utility
to the principal and the firm respectively is given by uo and uf as given in
(12). Hence, the outsourcing surplus is
Ωˆ
¡
φp, θ
¢
= uo + uf −
¡
vin
¡
0|φp, θ
¢
+ 0
¢
=
3
32
¡
3− 8θφp
¢
. (22)
This is positive if φp ≤ 38
1
θ . For φp ≥
3
4
1
θ the optimal agency under in-
house provision is not φa = 0, but it is straightforward to check that the
outsourcing surplus is also negative in this case. This gives
Proposition 4 Under partial delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing
if and only if
φp ≤ H (θ) ≡
3
8
1
θ
. (23)
If outsourcing is chosen, any agency is optimal for the principal. If inhouse
provision is chosen, the principal prefers an agency of type φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
as
given in (20).
Under partial delegation outsourcing is less likely than under no delega-
tion and arm’s length delegation, since H (θ) < G (θ). The reason is that
partial delegation enables principals of types close to G (θ) to specify inhouse
provision and choose an agency who gives an optimal incentive eﬀect. This
agency would prefer to outsource if it had the opportunity, and this choice
is therefore not an option for the principal under arm’s length delegation.
When the principal specifies inhouse provision, the situation is as under
mandatory inhouse provision. Hence, the principal can take full advantage
of the incentive eﬀect under partial delegation. The bargaining eﬀect, on the
other hand, vanishes under partial delegation since the initial contracting
with the firm is done by the principal herself. Still the improved prospects
under inhouse provision makes the principal herself a better negotiator with
the firm allthough not as good as the agency, who is at the brink of choos-
ing inhouse provision. All in all outsourcing is a less attractive option for
principals with φp in the vicinity of G (θ) . Principals with low preference for
quality still prefer outsourcing, for them the strong cost reductions made by
the firm are still attractive.
2.2.4 Double-delegation
Our final delegation mode is double-delegation, where the principal delegates
the outsourcing decision to agency a1 and the authority to hire and conduct
the post-contractual renegotiation to another agency, a2.
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For agency a1, the principal’s choice of agency a2 is then given, and if
he chooses inhouse provision his utility is vin
¡
φa2 |φa1 , θ
¢
(as given in (19)),
while the utility if he chooses outsourcing is vout
¡
φa2 |φa1 , θ
¢
(from (21)).
Inserting, we find that inhouse provision is chosen by a1 if
φa1 ≥
3
8θ
(1− γ) + (1 + 7γ)
8
φa2 (24)
If a1 and a2 are chosen such that (24) is fulfilled with equality, the out-
sourcing surplus between the firm and a1 is zero, and the outsourcing price
therefore equals zero. If the principal wishes to outsource, she should take
advantage of this. The principal’s utility from outsourcing will then be
(again using 21)
v˜out
¡
φp, θ
¢
= φp (Q0 − θ)−
µ
C0 −
1
2
¶
If inhouse provision is chosen, the optimal choice of agency a2 maximizes
vin
¡
φa2 |φp, θ
¢
. The solution is φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
as given in Proposition 2. Insert-
ing into the principal’s utility function and comparing with v˜out
¡
φp, θ
¢
leads
to
Proposition 5 Under double delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing
if and only if
φp ≤ H (θ) ≡
3
8
1
θ
(25)
In this case, the principal chooses a1 and a2 fulfilling (24) and reaps the
outsourcing surplus. Otherwise the principal chooses inhouse provision and
she prefers an agency a2 of type φmia
¡
φp, θ
¢
as given in (20).
Hence, the outsourcing decision and the delegation under inhouse provi-
sion are the same under double-delegation and partial delegation. However,
when outsourcing is preferred by the principal, she can take advantage of
the possibility of delegating the outsourcing decision to a type who is just
at the brink of choosing inhouse provision and reap all of the outsourcing
surplus. It is intuitive that the outsourcing decision is the same under the
two institutions: Under partial delegation the outsourcing surplus is zero
for principal φp = H (θ) . She is therefore indiﬀerent between outsourcing or
not, and the firm’s total payment equals zero. Clearly, she can not improve
upon this situation by delegating this decision to an agent.
2.2.5 Eﬃciency
The principal does not directly internalize the eﬀort cost of the service
provider, so the outcome is not necessarily maximizing joint surplus. In
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this section, we consider eﬃciency, by which we understand the sum of util-
ity of the principal and the service provider, the net surplus as given in (9),
which we restate for convenience17
N(ec, φp, θ) = s(ec, φp, θ)−
1
2
e2c =
¡
1− φpθ
¢
ec −
1
2
e2c .
The first best level of eﬀort maximizes the net surplus and is e∗c = 1−θφp,
for φp ≤ 1/θ cf (10) .
We are interested in understanding which institution for allocation of
authority creates most surplus from the provision of the service. Figure 1
depicts the net surplus as a function of φp for the case where the quality
reduction parameter, θ, equals one, and the market power parameter, γ,
euqals a half. First best is the solid grey curve; no delegation is the solid
black line which has a kink at φp = G(θ); arm’s length outsourcing is given
by the combination of the solid black line for φp ≤ G(θ) and the dashed
black line for φp ≥ G(θ); mandatory inhouse provision is the dashed grey
line; and, finally, partial delegation and double delegation are the dotted line
that combine the solid black line for φp ≤ H (θ) with the dashed grey line
for φp ≥ H (θ).
Figure 1 shows that arm’s length, partial and double delegation (weakly)
dominate no delegation, and are strictly better when the service is produced
inhouse. When the service is outsourced, the eﬀort level is chosen by the firm
without regard to any renegotioation. Thus, the eﬀort level and joint surplus
are the same whether there is delegation or not. Under inhouse production
there is delegation to an agency, which cares less about quality. This yields
stronger incentives for the public manager to perform cost reducing eﬀort
and this increases the joint surplus.
The Figure also demonstrates that partial and double delegation are the
most eﬃcient modes. They have the advantage over mandatory inhouse
provision that the benefits from outsourcing are reaped for low φp and they
have the advantage over arm’s length outsourcing that the principal needs
not worry that the preferred agency under inhouse provision cares so little
about quality that it prefers to outsource. Under arm’s length outsourcing,
the principal modifies the choice of agency when φp is close to G (θ) in order
to ensure that the agency chooses inhouse provision.
Finally, the Figure illustrates that full eﬃciency can only be acheived for
high φp. These types of principals have the option to delegate to an agency
who cares suﬃciently less about quality that the public manager can be
induced to choose the first best level of eﬀort. Partial and double delegation
allow this for a larger range of φp than arm’s lenght.
17We hesitate in defining the principal’s and the service provider’s joint surplus as
welfare, since this is only true when the principal internalises all interest in the society
but the service provider’s.
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In the following proposition we rank the diﬀerent institutions according
to the net surplus generated and we show that the intuition provided by
Figure 1 carries over to the more general case of .θ,≥ 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1]. The
proof of the proposition is straightforward: For each institution, we can
find the induced eﬀort level (using ec = 1 whenever there is outsourcing
and equation (6) when there is inhouse provision together with the φa of
the chosen agency). This eﬀort level is then inserted into N
¡
ec, φp, θ
¢
.
Remembering that H(θ) ≡ 38θ <
3
7θ ≡ G(θ), we have:
Proposition 6 Eﬃciency of institutions for allocation of authority:
a) Delegation improves service provision: For any φp ≤ 1θ , Arm’s Length,
Partial and Double Delegation give at least as high surplus as No Delegation.
For G (θ) < φp <
1
θ all types of delegation give strictly higher surplus than
No Delegation.
b) For φp ≤ H(θ) all institutions (except Mandatory Inhouse Provision)
lead to outsourcing and are equally good. For H(θ) < φp ≤ G(θ) only Arm’s
Length, Double and No Delegation lead to outsourcing.
c) Partial and Double Delegation yield at least as high surplus as any
other institution and if H(θ) < φp ≤ 2G(θ) they yield strictly higher surplus
than No Delegation and Arm’s Length Delegation.
d) First best can be achieved if and only if 2H(θ) ≤ φp. If 1θ ≤ φp all
institutions lead to first best. If 2G(θ) ≤ φp then any type of delegation leads
to first best. If 2H(θ) ≤ φp < 2G(θ), then Partial, Double and Mandatory
inhouse provision lead to first best.
2.2.6 The principal’s ranking
The diﬀerent institutions for allocating authority give the principal diﬀerent
options. Suppose the principal could chose the institution, which one would
she choose? It it straightforward that any type of delegation is (weakly) bet-
ter for the principal than non-delegation. Under delegation it is an option
for the principal to choose a type equal to herself, thus mimicking non-
delegation. Whenever she does something diﬀerent, it is because it gives
her higher utility. By similar replication arguments, we notice that double
delegation must be weakly prefered to other kinds of delegation and that par-
tial delegation is (weakly) better for the principal than mandatory inhouse
provision.18
The comparison between the two more realistic cases of partial delegation
and arm’s length delegation is more involved. Partial delegation has the
advantage that the pricipal needs not worry that the agency may outsource,
when the principal is not interested in this, and so the principal can choose
18Remember from footnote 3 that Double delegation can mimick both arm’s length
delegation and partial delegation. Partial delegation mimicks mandatory inhouse provision
whenever the principal decides not to outsource.
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from a wider array of agencies and take full advantage of the incentive eﬀect,
when she prefers inhouse provision. Arm’s length delegation, on the other
hand, has the advantage, that when the principal prefers outsourcing, she
can use the bargaining eﬀect and reap the whole surplus from outsourcing.
From Proposition 4 it is clear that outsourcing only is better for the principal
than inhouse provision with the optimal agency when φp ≤ H (θ) . From
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we know that the choice of agency is the
same under arm’s length delegation and partial delegation when 2G (θ) ≤ φp
and that the all modes lead to the same utility for the principal if 1θ ≤ φp.
Summarizing the discussion, we therefore have
Proposition 7 The principal’s most preferred institution for allocation of
autority is as follows:
If 0 ≤ φp ≤ H (θ) or 2G (θ) ≤ φp arm’s length and double delegation
are optimal for the principal.
If H (θ) ≤ φp partial delegation, double delegation and mandatory in-
house provision are optimal for the principal.
If 1θ ≤ φp all modes are optimal for the principal.
3 One task: Quality Improvement
In this section we briefly look at the case where the important task is im-
provement and development of the service rather than cost reductions. An
example would be military procurement. In the development of a stealth
fighter, cost reductions have not been in the forefront, the quality of the
fighter appears much more important. The section provides part of the in-
tuition for the results we obtain when there are two important tasks, cost
reductions and quality improvements.
Eﬀort is now directed at improving the service, we call such eﬀort eq. The
eﬀort materializes in plans for improvement, when they are implemented the
resulting quality of the service is
Q (ec) = Q0 + eq. (26)
The eﬀort cost for the service provider is (1/2)e2q .
Inhouse provision: As above, the public manger recevives a quarter of
the surplus, so his optimizing eﬀort choice is eq = φa/4 and the principal’s
utility from inhouse provision, when she delegates to agency φa, becomes
uinq = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 +
1
2
µ
φa
4
¶2!
.
The first best choice of eﬀort is e∗q = φp and the optimal delegation under
inhouse provision is to an agency with φa = 4φp. It follows that delegation
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through mandatory inhouse provision secures first best ressource allocation
as does inhouse provision under partial (and, thus, double) delegation.
When the principal outsources, there will now be renegotiation with the
firm, who owns the plans for improvement of the service.19 The surplus
is split and the optimizing eﬀort choice for the firm is eq = φp/2. The
outsourcing surplus between the firm and the principal is (5/32)φ2p. Notice
that this surplus is increasing in the principal’s type, the reason is that the
firm has stronger incentives to provide eﬀort than the public manager and
the extra eﬀort is more valueable the more the principal cares about the
quality. The utility for the principal under arm’s length delegation, when
he delegates to agency φa, who outsources, is
uoq
¡
φp, θ
¢
= φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
2
¶
−
µ
C0 +
1
8
φ2a +
γ
32
5φ2a
¶
(27)
The outsourcing surplus is positive whenever φa = φp implying that no
delegation and arm’s length delegation induces outsourcing. The optimal
agency maximizes (27), which gives
φa =
8
4 + 5γ
φp. (28)
The optimal agency puts more weight on quality than the principal. The
reason is the incentive eﬀect, which now also enters in relation to the firm.
When eﬀort is directed at improving the service, there is renegotiation with
the firm - just as with the public manager. The mechanism is similar to
the one present with the public manager, by delegating to an agency with
higher preference for quality, the principal gives the firm stronger incentives,
since the agency is more willing to pay for improvements. This increased
pay to the firm is again partly oﬀset in the initial contracting, here the firm
receives a price which covers the outside option, the eﬀort cost - and unlike
the public manager - also part of the surplus, depending on the degree of
market power. Market power therefore mitigates the incentive eﬀect. If
there is no market power, the optimal agency puts double as much weight
on quality as the principal, reflecting that the firm’s incentive is only half of
what it ideally should be. The more market power the firm has, the larger
is the fraction it keeps of the outsourcing surplus. The principal responds
by delegating to a more moderate agency.
Under double delegation, the principal can gain by delegating the out-
sourcing decision to an agency, who is more reluctant to outsource. Given
19We assume that the firm will only implement the quality improvement if it gets its
share of the surplus. Strictly speaking, the firm is indiﬀerent between implementing the
quality improvement or not. However, in reality this will most likely increase cost. At
the cost of extra notation, this could have been introduced explicitly. For notational
simplicity, we just assume that the firm, when indiﬀerent, chooses not to implement the
quality improvement.
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agency a2 conducts the renegotiation, the outsourcing surplus for agency a1
is
Ωa1|a2 = φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
¶
−
µ
C0 +
1
8
φ2a2
¶
−
Ã
φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 +
1
2
µ
φa2
4
¶2!!
=
µ
1
4
φa1 −
3
32
φa2
¶
φa2 .
Hence, by choosing a1 and a2 such that φa1 =
3
8φa2 , and φa2 = 2φp, the
principal can attain first best and obtain an outsourcing price that leaves
no surplus to the private service provider.
To sum up, delegation is very powerful in the case where the only task is
quality improvement and there is no trade-oﬀ as in the cost reduction case.
First best can be achieved through delegation under both public and private
service provision.
4 Two tasks: Cost reduction and quality improve-
ment
We now consider the case where the service provider has two tasks and di-
rects eﬀort at cost reductions, ec, as well as at development and improvement
of the service, eq. In this case, the quality of the service becomes
Q (ec, eq) = Q0 + eq − θec
For simplicity, we assume that the eﬀort cost is separable in the tasks, equal
to (1/2) e2c and (1/2) e
2
q respectively. The general case represents a mixture
of the two cases discussed above. From the previous sections we know that
when cost reductions are crucial and the cost - quality trade oﬀ is in focus,
principals, who value quality less, outsource. When quality improvements
are crucial and cost reductions are not possible, all types outsource, and the
outsourcing surplus is higher the more the principal values quality. The two
tasks, therefore, give diﬀerent incentives and the results in the two-task case
depend on how serious the quality deterioating eﬀects of cost reductions are
as reflected in the parameter θ, and how much the principal values quality
as given by φp. We will focus on the case, where cost reductions, although
not irrelevant, involves a non-trivial trade oﬀ in relation to quality. This is
the case when θ > 0, so cost reductions hurt quality, and 1 − θφ ≥ 0, so
that there will be cost reducing eﬀort. Since the comparative statics wrt θ
is clear from the previous sections and in order to simplify the exposition,
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we will let θ = 1 in the following and accordingly restrict φp, φa, φa1 and
φa2 to the interval [0,1]
20.
4.1 No delegation
Under no delegation, the pricipal takes all decisions herself. The public
manager internalizes 1/4 of the surplus, so as above the eﬀort choices, under
no delegation, are eq = φp/4 and ec =
¡
1− θφp
¢
/4. The principal’s utility
of inhouse service provision is
v˜in = φp
µ
Q0 +
φp
4
−
1− φp
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− φp
4
+
1
2
µ
φp
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− φp
4
¶2!
.
(29)
When the principal outsources, the firm internalizes half of the surplus from
quality improvement and receives all cost reductions, it therefore chooses
eq = φp/2 and ec = 1.
The principal pays the outsourcing price p0 and pays half of the gross
surplus in the renegotiation, her utility therefore is
v˜out = φp
µ
Q0 +
φp
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
φ2p. (30)
In the Appendix we show that the outsourcing surplus equals21
Ω˜
¡
φp
¢
=
½
1
32
¡
5φ2p +
¡
3− 7φp
¢ ¡
φp + 3
¢¢
. (31)
which is simply the sum of the surplusses in the two individual cases con-
sidered above. The principal outsources when the surplus is positive, which
directly yields
Proposition 8 Under no delegation, the principal outsources in the two
task case iﬀ
φp ≤ G˜ =
3
√
11− 9
2
≈ 0.475
20 It may appear a bit "crude" that we restrict the parameter space for the φ0s to [0,1].
By doing it we avoid comparison with many cumbersome and unreasonable cases, where
the optimal solution involves no eﬀort on cost reduction. When φa > 1, there is no eﬀort
on cost and φa can freely be increased by the principal in order to induce more eﬀort on
quality. Hence the cost-quality trade-oﬀ disappears. This feature appears in our setting,
since the utility from quality is linear, which has the advantage that we can get closed
form solutions to the principal’s delegation problem. Had we instead assumed that utility
from quality was suﬃently convex, the optimal solution would always involve some cost
reducing eﬀort and the cost quality trade-oﬀ would always remain. In our simple linear
model, we obtain this feature by restricting the parameter space.
21The proofs of the two-task case left out in the text can be found in the Appendix.
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4.2 Delegation with two tasks
We now consider the various delegation regimes.
4.2.1 Mandatory inhouse provision
Undermandatory inhouse provision, the principal’s utility, when she chooses
agency φa is
v˜in = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
4
− 1− φa
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− φa
4
+
1
2
µ
φa
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− φa
4
¶2!
(32)
and the preferred agency maximizes this among φa fulfilling 0 ≤ φa ≤ 1.
This directly gives
Proposition 9 Under mandatory inhouse provision, principal φ0ps preferred
agency is in the two task case given by
φ˜
mi
a
¡
φp
¢
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if φp ≤ 38 ,
4φp − 32 if
3
8 ≤ φp ≤
5
8 ,
1 if 58 ≤ 1.
(33)
The choice of agency under mandatory inhouse provision is governed by
the incentive eﬀect and takes into account incentives to perform both eﬀort
tasks. For φp < 1/2, we have that φa = 4φp − 3/2 < φp, so the preferred
agency puts less weight on quality than the principal, while the opposite is
true for φp > 1/2. In both cases, it reflects the incentive eﬀect: When φp
is low, the principal does not care so much about the quality of the service
and the most important issue is cost reductions. Strong incentives for cost
reductions are provided by choosing an agency with low φa, just as is the
case when cost reductions is the only task. When φp > 1/2, on the other
hand, the most important task is improvements and therefore an agency
with high φa is chosen, just as is the case when improvements is the only
task.
Since the principal has to balance the incentives for both tasks, the
optimal agency does not lead to first best eﬀort levels. The first best choice
of eﬀorts are eq = φp and ec = 1− φp, while for φp ≤ 3/8 the eﬀort choices
are eq = 0 and ec = 14 . For 3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 5/8, they are eq =
¡
4φp − 32
¢
/4 =
φp − 3/8 and ec =
¡
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢¢
/4 = 5/8− φp. For φp ≥ 5/8, the choices
are eq = 1/4 and ec = 0.
4.2.2 Arm’s length delgation
Under arm’s length delegation, the principal chooses an agency, which takes
care of both the outsourcing decision and the renegotiation. This agency is in
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the same position as the principal is under no delegation, hence outsourcing
surplus between the agency and the firm is given by (31) with φa substituted
for φp.We can therefore directly infer that the agency outsources if and only
if
φa ≤ G˜ (34)
The principal’s utility if the agency outsources is therefore (compare with
(30))
v˜out = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
(φa)
2 (35)
Since the firm’s share of the outsourcing surplus γΩ˜ (φa) equals the out-
sourcing price, p0, less net costs, C0 − 1/2, plus net earnings from qual-
ity improving eﬀort (1/2)φa(φa/2)− (1/2)(φa/2)2, the outsourcing price p0
equals
p0 = γΩ˜ (φa) +C0 −
1
2
− 1
8
φ2a
The principal’s utility if the agency chooses inhouse provision is as in (32).
Maximizing over φa in (32) and in (35) (inserting for the price), and taking
into account the outsourcing condition (34) then directly leads to
Proposition 10 In the two task case, principal φ0ps preferred agency φa
under arm’s length delegation and the outsourcing decision is given by:
eφala ¡φp¢ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
8φp+9γ
4−2γ if 0 ≤ φp ≤
1
2G˜−
3
√
11
8 γ outsourcing
G˜ if 12G˜−
3
√
11
8 γ ≤ φp ≤ G˜ outsourcing
G˜ if G˜ ≤ φp ≤ 14G˜+
3
8 inhouse
4φp − 32 if
1
4G˜+
3
8 ≤ φp ≤
5
8 inhouse
1 if 58 ≤ φp ≤ 1 inhouse
As when cost reductions is the only task, principals who care less about
quality prefer outsourcing, while principals who care much about quality
prefers inhouse provision. Since the provider will also spend eﬀort at im-
provements, principals, who care very little about quality, do not prefer
agencies, who are at the brink at choosing inhouse provision (as was the
case when only cost reductions mattered). Although such agencies are op-
timal with respect to the bargaining eﬀect, they will, through the incentive
eﬀect, induce the firm to perform too much quality enhancing eﬀort and the
principal will have to pay for this through the price. The principal is not
intererested in that. A low φp principal therefore realizes that the bargain-
ing and the incentive eﬀects work in opposite directions, and she modifies
the choice of agency, to reduce the eﬀort spent on quality. The flip side of
the coin is that this leaves some surplus to the firm. The higher is market
power, γ, the more important is the bargaining eﬀect, and the higher φa is
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chosen. When φp is close to but still smaller than G˜, the principal’s choice
of agency is governed by the interest in reaping all surplus and the preferred
agency has φa = G˜.
For larger φp ≥ G˜, the principal prefers inhouse provision. As we have
seen above, when φp is close to G˜, the principal is constrained in her choice
of φa by the consideration that the agency should not prefer outsourcing,
therefore the optimal choice is φa = G˜. For larger φp, this is not so and the
results are as under mandatory inhouse provision.
As previously, the outsourcing decision is not aﬀected by arm’s length
delegation. Whether the principal decides herself or delegates the outsourc-
ing decision to the agency, outsourcing results if and only if φp < G˜ (θ).
The preferred agency is increasing in the principal’s type. Hence, if we
consider a representative democracy, where principals are voters, the median
voter’s preferred agency is a Condorcet winner.
4.2.3 Partial delegation
Recall that under partial delegation the principal first decides on outsourcing
and then chooses an agency. At the time when the agency is chosen, the
outsourcing price is therefore given. The optimal choice of agency maximizes
v˜out as given in (35) taking as given the outsourcing price p0. This gives
φa = φp.
When she outsources, the principal wishes to delegate to a type, who has
the same preferences as herself. We could also interpret this as she prefers
not to delegate the decision. Unlike under arm’s length outsourcing, the
principal can not factor in that a higher renegotiation surplus to the firm is
oﬀset through a lower initial price, since the price is given when the agency
is chosen. Hence the incentive eﬀect is not present and the optimal agency
has the same preferences as the principal.
If the principal chooses inhouse provision her utility is given by (32). In
the Appendix we compare the relevant utilities from inhouse provision and
outsourcing and show that
Proposition 11 Under partial delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing
in the two task case if and only if
φp ≤ Gˆ =
3
2
√
10
≈ 0.474.
If outsourcing is chosen, the principal prefers an agency of her own
type. If inhouse provision is chosen, the principal prefers an agency of type
φ˜
mi
a
¡
φp
¢
as given in Proposition 9.
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4.2.4 Double-delegation
Recall that under double-delegation, the principal delegates the outsourc-
ing decision to agency a1 and the authority to hire and conduct the post-
contractual renegotiation to a diﬀerent agency, a2. In the Appendix, we
show that the outsourcing surplus between agency a1 and the firm in this
case is
Ω12 =
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 6φa2 − 2φ
2
a2 + 9
¢
Agency a1 therefore outsources iﬀ
φa1 ≤
6φa2 − 2φ2a2 + 9
24
(36)
The principal’s utility from outsourcing is (compare with (35))
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
(φa2)
2
The optimal choice of φa1 and φa2 when the principal goes for outsourcing
maximizes this subject to the restriction (36). In the Appendix we show that
φa2 = 2φp, so the choice of agency a2 gives optimal incentives on the quality
improving task. The choice of agency a1 is made such that this agency is
indiﬀerent between outsourcing or not, so that the surplus is zero and the
price therefore as low as possible.
If the principal prefers inhouse provision, the principal’s utility is given
by (32) (with φa2 substituting for φa) and the choice of agency a2 is exactly
as under mandatory inhouse provision as in Proposition 9. By comparing
the relevant utility expressions for the principal in the two cases, inhouse
and outsoucing, we prove the rest of Proposition 12 in the Appendix
Proposition 12 Under double delegation, the principal chooses outsourcing
in the two task case if and only if
φp ≤ H˜ =
3
8
√
2 ≈ 0.53.
If outsourcing is chosen, the principal prefers an outsourcing agency,
φa1, such that equation (36) is satisfied with equality and a renegotiation
agency of type φa2 = max[2φp, 1].
If inhouse provision is chosen, the principal prefers any outsourcing
agency, φa1, such that the relevant inequality in (41) in the Appendix is
satisfied and a renegotiation agency of type φa2 = φ˜
mi
a
¡
φp
¢
as given in
Proposition 9.
Comparing the cases of partial and double delegation we notice that these
two institutions provide very diﬀerent outcomes under two tasks, which they
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did not do in the single task case. There will be more outsourcing under
double delegation than under partial delegation. The intuition is the follow-
ing. Under partial delegation we showed above that the bargaining eﬀect
is removed under outsourcing because the price is given at the time when
the agency is chosen. Under double delegation, the principal chooses the
renegotiation agency before the outsourcing agency has negotiated with the
private firm. Hence, the private firm knows the preference of the renego-
tiation agency and is willing to accept a lower price if it can foresee that
compensation will be higher in the renegotiation phase. Notice that if the
principal promised to delegate to the ex ante optimal renegotiation agency
before she negotiated the price with the private firm, the firm would recog-
nize that such a promise would not be ex post optimal. When the price is
fixed at any level the principal will prefer a renegotiation agency with similar
preferences as herself. Hence, the key in double delegation is the ability to
commit to the renegotiation agency before the price negotiations with the
private firm. Since this improves the outcome under outsourcing, it follows
that we shall observe more outsourcing under double delegation than under
partial delegation.
4.3 Eﬀort and eﬃciency in the dual task case.
We are now ready to provide som intuitive comparison of the various pro-
vison modes for the dual task case. Figures 2 and 3 show eﬀorts levels and
net surplus for each of the diﬀerent modes of service provision. 22
Part A in Figure 2 shows how investment in quality diﬀers across the
diﬀerent modes of service provision. First best eﬀort, e∗q = φp, is given by
the solid grey line. The solid black line yields the no delegation outcome.
Notice it increases with half the slope of first best until φp = eG reflecting
that the private service provider internalises - through renegotiation - half
of the additional surplus generated from investing in quality. When φp ex-
ceeds eG, the principal decides to switch from outsourcing to inhouse service
provision, which implies a drop in quality investment and that for higher
φp the quality investment only increases with 1/4 of the slope of first best
quality investment. This reflects that the public manager internalises only
a quarter of the additional surplus generated by his investment in quality.
22Remember that we have throughout the two task case for simplicity assumed that the
quality deterioration parameter θ is one and we have restricted the preferences for quality
parameters, φp, φa, φa1 and φa2 to be positive and less than or equal to one. To draw
the following figures we have in addition assumed that the market power, γ, is a half, i.e.
that the private firm and the principal (or the outsourcing agency) splits any outsourcing
surplus equally. We notice from above that we have marginally more outsourcing under
partial delegation than under arm’s length or no delegation (Gˆ ≈ 0.474 < 0.475 ≈ ?G).
However, the diﬀerence is small. Thus, to improve the readability of the figures we have
oppressed the ticks for the Gˆ condition, which is overlapping with the ?G condition.
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Arm’s length delegation is pictured by the dashed black line in the Fig-
ure. Notice that by delegating to a higher type under both outsourcing and
inhouse provision, the private firm and the public manager will have signif-
icant higher incentives for investment in quality. Under inhouse provision
there is lower quality investment but it does increase with the same slope
as the first best quality investment until the restriction φa ≤ 1 is binding.
When the service is outsourced we notice that there will be an ineﬃciently
high level of quality investment relative to first best. This may seem odd
from a first perspective, because it does not aﬀect the investment in cost
reduction. However, the principal prefers this because it increases the bar-
gaining eﬀect. The principal delegates to an agency, who puts more weight
on quality and is a tougher negotiator implying that the service is delivered
at a lower price from the private company. The cost of this is a distortion
in quality investment.23
Partial delegation is the dotted grey line that combines no delegation
under outsourcing where the principal - due to the absence of the bargaining
eﬀect - prefers not to delegate and arm’s length delegation under inhouse
provision where the presence of the incentive eﬀect provides incentives to
delegate.
Finally, Double delegation - the dotted black line - provides the most
powerful incentives to invest in quality. It leads to outourcing of service
provision for a larger range of quality preferences than any other service
provision modes. For the private provision case double delegation solves the
challenges facing the two former delegation modes: By picking the two agen-
cies simultanously it lowers the investment incentive relative to the arm’s
length without compromising on the bargaining eﬀect and relative to the
partial delegation it provides optimal incentives and exploits the bargaining
eﬀect by picking the two agencies simultanously.
Part B of Figure 2 provides the reverse picture with respect to invest-
ment in cost reduction. Again the downward sloping grey line is the first
best investment in cost reduction, i.e. e∗c = (1− φp). Remember that any
private firm will choose e∗c = 1, thus we see that there is too much cost re-
duction under private service production. Under public service provision, all
alternative provisions modes provide too few incentives for cost reduction.
However, when delegation is possible, the principal chooses to lower incen-
tives to cost reduction even further because this raises incentives to quality
improvement. Notice also, that in a small area to the right of G˜, mandatory
inhouse and partial delegation provide slightly stronger incentives to cost
cutting than arm’s length and no delegation. The reason is that the former
modes can pick a renegotiation agency that would like to outsource but who
is not given the right to decide upon the mode of service provision.
23Notice, that the quality eﬀort is constant under private provision due to that γ = 1/2
as is clear from Proposition 10 above.
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Figure 3 pictures the net surplus derived from the service provision.
Again the first best net surplus is the grey curve at the top of the figure. No
delegation (black line) approaches first best for a principal who does not care
about quality. However, the more the principal cares about quality the larger
is the reduction in net surplus due to to few incentives for quality investment
and too large incentives for cost reduction under private provision. When
the service is produced inhouse, the ineﬃciency of no delegation increases
due to the insuﬃcient incentives for quality improvement.
Delegation generally generate significantly more net surplus than no del-
egation under inhouse provision, i.e. when the principal cares about quality.
The figure, therefore, suggests the empirical implication, that delegation
provides eﬃciency improvement for public services that are clearly best pro-
vided inhouse. The benefit of delegation for extreme principals is restricted
by our restriction of the preference space. We have assumed that the most
extreme principal (φp = 1) cannot delegate to an even more extreme agency.
This is the reason that all delegation modes converges to the no delegation
case for φp → 1.24
The trade-oﬀ between a cheaper price for the service and a distortion in
quality investment under outsourcing implies that arm’s length delegation
generates lower net surplus than partial delegation or no delegation for very
low φp’s. The reason is that the price discount generated by the principal’s
choice does not show up in the netsurplus, since this is a redistribution from
the private firm to the public sector. This trade-oﬀ does not exist under
double delegation implying that double delegation always deliver the most
eﬃcient service provision. However, it is evident from the Figure that even
double delegation cannot solve all eﬃciency problems related to incomplete
contraction when the principal cares about quality.
5 Conclusion
Most public service provision is done in environments where it is diﬃcult
to contract upon on all future contingences. This paper has identified two
core eﬀects - the incentive and the bargaining eﬀects - that makes delega-
tion of decision authority a powerful policy instrument in managing public
service provision: First by strategically delegating the right to hire and nego-
tiate with a public or private service provider, the principal can manipulate
with the service provider’s incentive to reduce cost and/or increase quality.
Strategic delegation essentially becomes a substitute for explicit incentive
contracts. Second, by delegating the right to outsource to an agency that is
indiﬀerent between provison modes, the bargaining power of the private firm
is lowered implying that delegation can reduce the price of private provision
24 If we allowed for even more extreme agencies, the eﬃciency gain of delegation would
increase in φp under inhouse provision.
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of public service.
The analysis generated a number of empirically relevant implications:
First, the decision to outsource does not depend on the degree of competition
among private service providers. If there is a joint surplus from outsourcing
the outsourcing price will be adjusted so that outsourcing takes place. Sec-
ond, we identified two empirical relevant ways of delegating the outsourcing
decision - arm’s length and partial delegation. Both types of delegation
create more eﬃcient ressource allocation than no delegation. Third, partial
delegation is better than arm’s length delegation at creating eﬃciency when
service is produced inhouse.
A growing empirical literature investigate determinants of the choice of
service provider in public service provision (e.g. La Porta et al. (1997),
Brown and Potoski (2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2005)). This literature
documents that political preferences, degree of contractual incompleteness
and complexity of service provisions are all important factors in deciding
the type of service provision. Our analysis highlights that delegation is an
powerfull instrument in such settings. However, we do not explicitly provide
direct empirical support for our theoretical results. We believe there are at
least two challenges in doing so: First, as discussed in the Introduction, the
choice of delegation mode is only in limited amount directed by eﬃciency
considerations. In an election setting, most delegation will be arm’s length
where the electorate chooses a politician to be responsible for both the ou-
tourcing decision and the negotiation with a private service provider. In
the real world, double delegation is clearly not an option for the electorate.
However, partial delegation may be seen as a case of direct referendum,
where the electorate votes on outsourcing and delegates the implementation
of the result to an elected politician. Second, it is hard to think about coun-
terfactuals for our delegation results because almost all service provision
imply some degree of delegation from the principal due to time and capacity
constraints.
Delegation is an eﬃcient tool in providing better public service; how-
ever, our analysis also highlights the limitation of delegation in mitigating
more generally allocation distortions due to contractual incompleteness. As
discussed above, there are two necessary conditions for delegation to work:
First, delegation will increase the incentive part of a public manager’s re-
muneration and, therefore, leave him or her with a larger stake in the post
contractual renegotiation process. The contracting agency must be able to
foresee this and make a proportional reduction in the public manager’s base
salary. Second, the premise for delegation is that there exist suﬃciently
heterogenous preferences in the population over issues which are non con-
tractible.
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6 Appendix
Proofs for the two-task case
For ease of exposition we will first consider double delegation, where
principal delegates the outsourcing decision to agent φa1 and the renegoti-
ation to agent φa2. The other cases can then be found by inserting in the
relevant places for φa1 and φa2.
Agent φa1’s utility from inhouse provision, when renegotiation is dele-
gated to agent φa2 is
v˜in12 = φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
4
− 1− φa2
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− φa2
4
+
1
2
µ
φa2
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− φa2
4
¶2!
(37)
Under outsourcing the firm gets all benefits from cost reduction and half
of the gross surplus between the firm and agent φa2 from quality improving
eﬀort. The optimizing choices are therefore ec = 1 and eq = φa2/2. The total
expenditure for the principal is p0 plus what is paid in the renegotiation,
equal to half of the gross surplus, 12φa2
¡
1
2φa2
¢
. Agent φ0a1s utility from
outsourcing when φa2 renegotiates is therefore
v˜out12 = φa1
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
(φa2)
2 (38)
The initial contract is between the firm and agent φa1. The parties foresee
the subsequent renegotiation and the firm gets a fraction γ of the total
outsourcing surplus between the firm and agent φa1. Call this surplus Ω12.
Then uf = γΩ12. The firm’s part of the surplus consists partly of the initial
outsourcing price p0 less costs C0, partly of net cost savings 1− 12 , and partly
of the renegotiation pay less eﬀort costs φa2
φa2
4 −
1
2
³
φa2
2
´2
= 18φ
2
a2, so
uf12 = γΩ12 = p0 − C0 +
1
2
+
1
8
φ2a2
which gives
p0 = γΩ12 −
1
8
φ2a2 + C0 −
1
2
(39)
Recall that
Ω12 = v˜out12 + u
f
12 −
¡
v˜in12 + 0
¢
which gives
Ω12 =
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 6φa2 − 2φ
2
a2 + 9
¢
(40)
No delegation
Under no delegation all φ0s in the relevant formulas are φp. Hence (40)
and a little manipulation gives that the outsourcing surplus between the
principal and the firm is given by equation (31).
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Partial Delegation
From Proposition 9 we know that if the principal chooses inhouse provi-
sion and φp ≤ 3/8 then φa = 0 and the eﬀort levels are eq = 0 and ec = 1.
The utility to the principal in this case is
vin = φp
µ
Q0 −
1
4
¶
− C0 +
7
32
.
The outsourcing surplus, when the pricipal is expected to choose agent φa =
φp in case of outsoucing, is therefore
Ω˜ =
³
v˜out + u˜f
´
−
¡
vin + 0
¢
= φp
µ
Q0 +
φp
2
− 1
¶
− p0 −
1
4
¡
φp
¢2
+
µ
p0 − C0 +
1
2
+
1
8
φ2p
¶
−
µ
φp
µ
Q0 −
1
4
¶
− C0 +
7
32
¶
which is positive for all φp ≤ 3/8. Hence all types φp ≤ 3/8 outsource.
If 3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 5/8, Proposition 9 gives that the optimal agency under
inhouse provision is φa = 4φp − 3/2, so that
vin = φp
Ã
Q0 +
4φp − 32
4
−
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!
−
⎛
⎝C0 −
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
+
1
2
Ã
4φp − 32
4
!2
+
1
2
Ã
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!2⎞
⎠
Inserting into Ω˜ =
¡
v˜out + u˜f
¢
−
¡
vin + 0
¢
, then gives
Ω˜ =
1
64
¡
9− 40φ2p
¢
.
Which yields Proposition 11:25
Double delegation
Using (38), (40) and (39) (and substituting φp for φa1 in (38)) the prin-
cipal’s utility from outsourcing can be written
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
φa2
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
γΩ12 −
1
8
φ2a2 + C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
(φa2)
2
The optimal choice of φa1 and φa2 maximizes this subject to the restriction
(36). This gives
φa2 = max[2φp, 1]
φa1 =
12φp − 2
¡
max[2φp, 1]
¢2
+ 9
24
=
½
1
2φp −
1
3φ
2
p +
3
8 if φp ≤
1
2
1
2φp +
7
24 if φp >
1
2
25 It is straightforward to check that inhouse provision is also preferred for φp > 5/8.
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The choice of agent a2 gives optimal incentives on the quality improving task.
The choice of agent a1 is made such that this agent is indiﬀerent between
outsourcing or not, so that the surplus is zero and the price therefore as low
as possible.
If the principal prefers inhouse provision, the choice of agent a2 is ex-
actly as under mandatory inhouse provision as in Proposition 9. Then the
outsourcing surplus for agent a1 becomes
Ω12 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 9
¢
if φp ≤ 38
1
32
³
−24φa1 + 6
¡
4φp − 32
¢
− 2
¡
4φp − 32
¢2
+ 9
´
if 38 ≤ φp ≤
5
8
1
32
¡
−24φa1 + 6− 2 + 9
¢
if 58 ≤ 1
and with choices af a2 as in Proposition 9 agent a1 will chose inhouse pro-
vision if φa1 fulfills
9
24 ≤ φa1 ≤ 1 if φp ≤
3
8
−64φ2p+96φp−9
48 ≤ φa1 ≤ 1 if
3
8 ≤ φp ≤
5
8
13
24 ≤ φa1 ≤ 1 if
5
8 ≤ 1
(41)
If φp ≤ 3/8, the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 2φp under outsourcing and
φa2 = 0 under inhouse provision. The principal’s utilities then are:
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
2φp
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
¡
2φp
¢2
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
¡
2φp
¢2
and
vin = φp
µ
Q0 −
1
4
¶
− C0 +
7
32
Hence vout > vin for φp ≤ 3/8.
If 3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 12 , the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 2φp under outsourcing
and φa2 =
¡
4φp − 32
¢
under inhouse provision. The principal’s utilities then
are:
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
2φp
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
¡
2φp
¢2
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
¡
2φp
¢2
vin = φp
Ã
Q0 +
4φp − 32
4
−
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!
−
⎛
⎝C0 −
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
+
1
2
Ã
4φp − 32
4
!2
+
1
2
Ã
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!2⎞
⎠
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Hence vout − vin ≥ 0 iﬀ 964 −
1
2φ
2
p ≥ 0 or
φp ≤
3
8
√
2 ≈ 0.530 33
So vout > vin for3/8 ≤ φp ≤ 1/2.
If 1/2 ≤ φp ≤ 5/8, then the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 1 under
outsourcing and φa2 =
¡
4φp − 32
¢
under inhouse provision. The principal’s
utilities then are:
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
1
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
vin = φp
Ã
Q0 +
4φp − 32
4
−
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!
−
⎛
⎝C0 −
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
+
1
2
Ã
4φp − 32
4
!2
+
1
2
Ã
1−
¡
4φp − 32
¢
4
!2⎞
⎠
and vout − vin ≥ 0 iﬀ φp ≤ 18
√
5 + 14 = 0.529 51
Finally, if 5/8 ≤ φp, then the optimal choice of φa2 is φa2 = 1 under
outsourcing and φa2 = 1 under inhouse provision. The principal’s utilities
are
vout = φp
µ
Q0 +
1
2
− 1
¶
−
µ
−1
8
+ C0 −
1
2
¶
− 1
4
vin = φp
µ
Q0 +
1
4
− 1− 1
4
¶
−
Ã
C0 −
1− 1
4
+
1
2
µ
1
4
¶2
+
1
2
µ
1− 1
4
¶2!
and vin > vout iﬀ 1332
4
3 < φp . As
5
8 >
13
32
4
3 , v
in > vout for all φp ≥ 5/8. This
completes the Proof of Proposition 12.
Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods", (with Tim
Besley).
Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol. 116, No. 4, p.1343 — 1372, No-
vember 2001.
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Figure 1: Efficiency HOneTask: Cost ReductionL.
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Figure 2a: Quality Improving Effort.
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Figure 2b: Cost Reducing Effort.
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Figure 3: Efficiency HTwo Tasks: Quality Improvement andCost ReductionL.
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